The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Indian Banks: Survival of the Fittest?

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
A Brief Background of the Banking Sector

- Been dominated by public sector banks (after nationalization of banks in 1969 and 1980)
- Liberalization in early 1990s: easier entry, market based allocation of credit, and interest rates
- Post liberalisation: entry of private banks, more competition, improvement in bank efficiency and profitability. In 2007, public banks at par with private banks (except perhaps in credit allocation)

Financial crisis of 2008

- Indian financial sector considered safe, sound and "lazy" and not expected to have a large impact of the crisis
- Main effects (Aziz, Patnaik and Shah) were felt on: stock market, exchange rate, and liquidity conditions
- deposit withdrawal (particularly from private banks) or rather "deposit reallocation"

Deposit Growth across Ownership Groups (weighted Averages)



First Set of Questions that we ask:

- Health vs Ownership: Was the reallocation of deposits a function of the health of individual banks or only of ownership?
- Reallocation to all Public Sector Banks (PSBs) or only to select public financial institutions?
- Explicit Guarantee or Implicit Guarantee: Did public sector banks attract depositors because they enjoyed an explicit government guarantee, or the implicit guarantee that the government would not allow the banks to fail?
- Credit growth during the crisis: Did public banks extend more credit to private sector

Second Set of Questions

- Performance after the crisis: How different kinds of banks fared during the recovery from the crisis?
- Ownership and lending during the crisis: Is the comparative performance of different banks during the recovery phase attributable to ownership?
- Profitability and asset quality after the crisis: related to ownership?

Limitations and Omissions

- Country specific study: can't be generalized
- We focus mainly on domestic banks in this paper
- We use annual data (common in the literature), but higher frequency data would have perhaps allowed us to tell richer stories
- With two years of post crisis data, perhaps do not have the complete fallout of the crisis

Data

- Annual balance sheet data for FY 2004-2012 from the Reserve Bank of India: 2004-07 (pre crisis); 2008-2010 (crisis years); 2011-
 - 12 (post crisis years)
- We use the data for 44 private and public banks: 25 public sector banks, and 19 private banks

Methodology

- Y_{it} = Bank Fixed Effects_i + Dummies for FY years 2008, 2009, 2010 + Dummies for FY years 2008, 2009, 2010* Dummy for Public Ownership of Banks + ε_{it}
- Y_{it :} Deposit growth, Lending growth, Return, Provisioning (as a proxy for asset quality)
- Coefficient of interest: interaction of crisis year dummies and dummy for public ownership of banks; difference in difference estimates
- FY 2004-07 pre crisis years; FY 2008-2010 crisis years; and FY 2011-12 post crisis (recovery period)

Methodology

- Deposit growth $_{it}$ = Bank Fixed Effects_i +
- Dummies for Fiscal years 2008, 2009, 2010 +
- Dummies for years 2008, 2009, 2010 * Dummy for Public Ownership of Banks +
- Bank Controls (Size_{it}, return on assets $_{it}$, asset quality, funding structure, capital, liquidity) +
- Dummies for years 2008, 2009, 2010 * Bank Controls size, return on assets, ownership, asset quality) + Government support to banks in t or t-1 + ε_{it}

Change in Bank Deposits- (Table 2)					
	(1)	(2)			
Dummy, Year 2008	1.47	1.47			
	[0.42]	[0.41]			
Dummy, Year 2009	-7.00*	-7.00*			
	[1.70]	[1.69]			
Dummy, Year 2010	-7.52*	-7.52*			
	[1.86]	[1.85]			
Year 2008*Public banks, SBI	-0.89				
	[0.23]				
Year 2009*Public banks, SBI	5.07				
	[1.12]				
Year 2010*Public banks, SBI	4.23				
	[0.93]				
Year 2008*Public Banks		-1.21			
		[0.31]			
Year 2009*Public Banks		4.25			
		[0.94]			
Year 2010*Public Banks		4.38			
		[0.95]			
Year 2008*State Bank of India		6.77*			
		[1.90]			
Year 2009*State Bank of India		24.89***			
		[5.99]			
Year 2010*State Bank of India		0.7			
		[0.17]			
R-squared	0.25	0.26			
Observations	308	308			

Change in Bank Deposite (Table 2)

Results I

- Private banks experienced slower deposit growth during the crisis; the effect was sharpest in FY 2009 and FY 2010
- Public banks, did not experience a similar slowdown (or an acceleration) in deposit growth
- The State Bank of India experienced especially rapid growth in deposits.

Change in Bank Deposits, Including other Controls-(Table 3)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Year 2008*State Bank of India	7.00**	5.11	6.92*	6.42*	4.36	
	[2.02]	[1.32]	[1.94]	[1.86]	[1.46]	
Year 2009*State Bank of India	25.14** *	24.30***	24.96***	24.59***	22.66***	
	[5.92]	[5.70]	[5.96]	[6.22]	[6.44]	
Year 2010*State Bank of India	0.84	0.97	0.76	-0.12	0.54	
	[0.21]	[0.23]	[0.19]	[0.03]	[0.14]	
Return on Assets, Lag	3.16**					
	[2.14]					
Current+Sav Deposits/Liabilities, Lag	-	0.64*				
		[1.97]				
Capital/Assets, Lag			0.35			
			[0.58]			
Provisioning/Assets, Lag				-2.91		
				[1.38]		
Size, Log Assets, Lag					-16.46***	
					[3.25]	
R-squared	0.28	0.29	0.27	0.28	0.31	
Observations	308	308	308	308	308	

Change in Bank Deposits across Ownership Groups- (Table 4)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
Year 2008*State Bank of India	26.91*	8.18**	2.82	8.81**	5.90*		
	[1.93]	[2.53]	[0.73]	[2.23]	[1.77]		
Year 2009*State Bank of India	45.19** *	25.87***	23.2***	24.3***	21.17***		
	[2.97]	[6.67]	[7.25]	[5.26]	[6.79]		
Year 2010*State Bank of India	30.72** *	1.13	5.75	2.82	-1.76		
	[2.91]	[0.27]	[1.36]	[0.57]	[0.55]		
Bank Characteristic	Bank	Return on Assets	Retail	Capital/	Provisioning/		
included	Size	Ketuin on Assets	Funding	Assets	Assets		
Bank Characteristic	20.24** *	8.62***	-1.29***	-0.89*	-5.73*		
	[3.93]	[4.10]	[4.10]	[1.89]	[1.96]		
Characteristic* 2008	-4.88	3	0.41	2.36***	2.59		
	[1.53]	[0.65]	[1.11]	[2.75]	[0.46]		
Characteristic* 2009	-5.42	6.02**	0.01	-0.61	-10.05**		
	[1.58]	[2.05]	[0.04]	[0.25]	[2.44]		
Characteristic* 2010	-7.65***	*-1.29	-0.37	2.57	-8.44		
	[3.06]	[0.42]	[1.19]	[1.62]	[1.63]		

Result II

- Depositors discriminated in favor of banks that were: healthier and had more stable funding
- The reallocation of deposits toward the SBI, in particular, cannot be explained by these factors alone or by explicit capital injections by the government.
- Depositors perhaps confident for other reasons that their deposits were safer with the SBIimplicit guarantee of the liabilities of the country's largest public bank dominated other considerations?

(1)(2)(4)(3)Assets Growth Credit Growth Return Capital/Assets Year 2008 3.19 0.08 -3.56 0.21 [1.14] [0.67][1.59] [0.46]-7.14** 0.03 Year 2009 -9.49 0.18 [2.17][1.67] [1.57] [0.25]Year 2010 -5.88* -10.05* 0.02 -0.02 [0.14][1.72] [1.80] [0.21]Year 2008*Public Banks -1.98 0.27 -0.23 -0.60* [0.59] [0.04][2.01] [1.61] -0.64** Year 2009*Public Banks 3.02 -3.03 -0.22 [0.82] [0.47] [1.55] [2.20] -0.71** -0.04 Year 2010*Public Banks 2.22 -7.5 [0.56] [0.33] [1.19] [2.22]Year 2008*State Bank of India 8.10*** 1.69 -0.16-0.1 [2.88] [0.32][1.21] [0.60]20.53*** Year 2009*State Bank of India 0.68 -0.12 -0.08 [6.24] [0.12][1.04] [0.58]Year 2010*State Bank of India -0.73-7.95 -0.04-0.03[0.21] [1.43] [0.32][0.29]**R**-squared 0.28 0.27 0.56 0.63 308 308 308 308 **Observations**

Credit Growth, Returns and Capital during Crisis -Table 5

Results III

- Credit growth does not differ much across banks
- Credit growth of the SBI is not unusually large during the crisis
- Return on assets does not differ much across ownership groups.

Analyzing the post-crisis period

• $Y_{i, 2011, 2012} = Y_{i, avg in 2009, 2010} + Y_{i, avg in 2005-07} + Dummy for$ Public Banks + Other Controls (size, returns, provisions, capital injection)_{, avg in 2009, 2010} + ε_{it} (3)

<u>Deposit Growth and Credit Growth in 2011,2012 (Table 6)</u>							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
Dependent Variable	Ι	Deposits Growth			Credit Growth		
Dummy for all other PSB	-4.15*	-4.00*	-4.43*	-3.82	-4.27		
	[1.79]	[1.68]	[1.79]	[1.29]	[1.29]		
Dummy for the SBI	-7.25*	-8.15	-8.89	-11.45***	-11.56***		
	[1.80]	[1.50]	[1.64]	[3.87]	[3.80]		
Avg. Change in Deposits in 2005-07	-0.03	0.01	-0.01				
	[0.22]	[0.04]	[0.12]				
Avg. Change in Deposits in 2009-10		0.29	0.23				
		[0.83]	[1.13]				
Capital Injection in 2009, 2010		-5.54**	-5.73***				
		[2.54]	[2.79]				
Avg. Size in 2009, 2010		0.01	0.13				
		[0.01]	[0.10]				
Avg. Return in 2009, 2010		-0.88					
		[0.21]					
Avg. Provision in 2009, 2010			-1.80				
			[0.61]				
Credit Growth (2005-07)				-0.12	-0.09		
				[0.60]	[0.49]		
Credit Growth (2009-10)					0.12		
					[0.52]		
Observations	82	82	82	82	82		
R-squared	0.052	0.135	0.137	0.048	0.059		


Deposit Crowth and Credit Crowth in 2011 2012 (Table 6)

Return on Assets and Provisioning in 2011,2012 (Table7)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Return on Assets			Provisions			
Dummy for all other PSB	22***	29***	21***	0.23***	0.12	0.13*	0.24***
	[3.22]	[5.31]	[2.66]	[3.93]	[1.44]	[1.75]	[4.31]
Dummy for the SBI	30***	56***	41***	0.70***	0.45**	0.46***	0.72***
	[3.10]	[3.97]	[2.89]	[10.80]	[2.62]	[2.94]	[11.51]
Avg. Return on Assets in 2005-07	0.12	0.12	0.02				
	[0.76]	[0.78]	[0.17]				
Avg. Return on Assets, in 2009-10	0.42**	0.34*	0.56***				
	[2.44]	[1.83]	[4.00]				
Capital Injection in 2009, 2010		-0.21**	-0.14		-0.04	-0.03	
		[2.59]	[1.47]		[0.43]	[0.36]	
Avg. Size in 2009-10		0.07*	0.03		0.06	0.06	
		[1.79]	[1.15]		[1.48]	[1.62]	
Credit Growth in 2009-10			-0.01**			0.00	0.00
			[1.99]			[1.19]	[1.12]
Avg. Provisioning in 2005-7					-0.13	-0.13	-0.23*
					[1.18]	[1.21]	[1.92]
Avg. Provisioning in 2009, 2010					0.31**	0.38***	0.45***
					[2.15]	[2.86]	[3.96]
Observations	81	81	81	81	81	81	81
R-squared	0.455	0.498	0.586	0.330	0.357	0.380	0.351


Results IV (Post crisis)

- Post crisis public sector banks and the SBI in particular experienced slower deposit growth (after controlling for the growth in preceding years)
- PSBs and SBI had slower credit growth
- PSB and SBI had lower returns and higher provisioning


Return on Assets- Figure 5



Non Performing Loans/Assets- Figure 6



Credit Growth- Figure 7



Foreign Banks

• Deposit growth of foreign banks slows down to the same extent as for private banks (even if numerically large, not statistically different from that of the private banks)

 Could extend out work along many dimensions (along the lines of Claessens et.al (various years) and Detragiache and Gupta): Does the effect on foreign banks depend on their regional orientation, health of parent banks etc.

Literature

Ownership and effects of the crisis:

- Public vs private (Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012), Feler and Coleman (2012))
- Domestic vs foreign (Claessens et al (various years), Detragiache and Gupta (2006))
- Acharya, Agarwal and Kulkarni (2012) on India

Main results:

- Public banks increased lending during the crisis, partly because of the support and policies
- Foreign banks retracted the most, magnitude depended on other factors as well
- Public sector firms outperformed private sector firms despite having greater systemic risk during the crisis

Summary of Results

- Deposit reallocation to the SBI
- Cannot be explained by balance sheet variables
- Plausible factor: expectation of an implicit guarantee
- PSBs or the SBI do not necessarily perform better in the recovery period following the crisis

Thank You!